Prison Term Mandatory When Conviction Includes Additional Time for Gun Possession

Because a firearm specification enhances a prison sentence, an offender must receive a prison sentence for the felony involving a gun in addition to the mandatory prison time for the firearm specification, the Supreme Court of Ohio ruled today.

In a 6-1 decision, the Supreme Court reversed an Eighth District Court of Appeals decision, which found a Cuyahoga County woman could receive two years of community control for a firearm offense and one year of mandatory prison time for a firearm specification.

Writing for the Court majority, Chief Justice Sharon L. Kennedy stated that Ohio’s felony sentencing laws separate specifications from “offenses.” Under R.C. 2929.13(F)(8), a trial court must impose a prison sentence for the offense if a firearm specification is attached.

“Consequently, when the trial court sentences a defendant for a firearm specification, it is not sentencing for a separate offense but instead is imposing additional punishment for the underlying offense,” she wrote.

Justices Patrick F. Fischer, R. Patrick DeWine, Joseph T. Deters, Daniel R. Hawkins, and Megan E. Shanahan joined Chief Justice Kennedy’s opinion.

In a dissenting opinion, Justice Jennifer Brunner wrote the Eighth District appropriately applied the law when it found the trial court could sentence Jadyn Logan to community control and only require prison time for the firearm specification. She criticized the majority opinion for omitting a key phrase of R.C. 2929.13(F)(8) in reaching the conclusion that prison time is required for the underlying offense when a firearm specification is included.

“R.C. 2929.13(F)(8) plainly does not require a prison sentence to be imposed for the underlying felony in Logan’s case,” she wrote.

Repeat Offender Convicted of Firearm Crime
In January 2018, Logan was convicted of aggravated robbery, a first-degree felony. Under R.C. 2923.13(A)(2), the conviction prevented her from possessing a firearm, which is referred to as a “disability.” In 2021, a Cuyahoga County grand jury indicted her for having weapons while under a disability, improperly handling a firearm in a motor vehicle, and carrying a concealed weapon.

In exchange for dismissing the other charges, Logan pleaded guilty to attempting to have weapons while under a disability with a one-year firearm specification. The trial court imposed two years of community control for attempting to have weapons and one year in prison for the firearm specification. The Cuyahoga County Prosecutor’s Office appealed the sentencing, arguing R.C. 2929.13(F)(8) required a prison term for the underlying offense of attempting to have weapons.

An Eighth District panel rejected the prosecutor’s argument and affirmed the sentence. The prosecutor requested that the entire Eighth District consider the ruling. In an en banc decision, the Eighth District ruled the law only requires a prison sentence for the specification, not the underlying gun offense.

The prosecutor’s office appealed to the Supreme Court, which agreed to hear the case. The Court also noted the Eighth District’s opinion conflicted with opinions from six other appellate districts and agreed to resolve the conflict.

Supreme Court Analyzed Sentencing Rules
Chief Justice Kennedy explained state sentencing laws distinguish offenses from specifications. An offense is a crime specified by the Revised Code, and a penalty is provided for violating the law. Noting the Court’s 2011 State v. Ford decision, she wrote that a firearm specification is a penalty enhancement, not a criminal offense. The purpose of the firearm specification is to “enhance the punishment of criminals who voluntarily introduce a firearm while committing an offense and to deter criminals from using firearms.”

The Court noted that the General Assembly has since amended R.C. 2929.13. At the time of Logan’s sentencing, the law required a trial court to impose a prison term for any offense that is a felony “with respect to the portion of the sentence imposed pursuant to [R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(a)] for having the firearm.” R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(a) is the law requiring a prison sentence for the firearm specification.

The opinion explained that the General Assembly was aware of the Court decisions distinguishing offenses from specifications when it drafted R.C. 2929.13(F)(8), and by stating a prison sentence is required for any felony offense, the law applies only to the offense and not the firearm specification.

The Court ruled when the law is read in context with other sentencing statutes, it becomes clear that a prison term is required for the gun possession crime. R.C. 2929.15 outlines when a trial court can impose a community control sanction. The law does not allow for community control when a crime requires a prison sentence, the opinion noted. The Court has ruled that for each offense, a court must impose either a prison term or community control.

R.C. 2929.14, the law governing firearm specifications, requires prison sentences, the Court noted. The trial court could not sentence Logan to community control for a charge that included a firearm specification, the opinion stated. The Eighth District ruled that the last phrase of R.C. 2929.13(F)(8), which reads “with respect to the portion of the sentence imposed pursuant to [R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(a)] for having the firearm,” only means that prison time is required for the specification.

The Court explained that the sentencing law is crafted to address situations where a criminal defendant is sentenced for multiple offenses.

“For example, when the trial court sentences an offender for a felony offense that does not carry a firearm specification and a felony that does contain a firearm specification, the portion of the sentence imposed for the offense carrying the firearm specification requires a prison term while the portion of the sentence imposed for the offense that does not carry the specification does not,” the Court concluded.

The Court remanded the case to the trial court to resentence Logan.

Law Does Not Require Prison Sentence, Dissent Maintained
In her dissent, Justice Brunner wrote that R.C. 2929.13(F)(8) requires no speculation about what the General Assembly intended, and she stated that the majority “jumps directly to interpretation, hypothesizing that the phrase has been placed in the statute ” to address multiple offenses. But some prison sentences, like Logan’s, apply to one offense, she wrote.

Justice Brunner noted that a trial court’s authority to impose community control instead of prison turns on the meaning of R.C. 2929.13(F)(8). That statute only mandates a prison sentence for the portion of the sentence involving the gun specification. It does not state anything about the underlying offense, and if the legislature allows community control for the offense Logan was charged with, then the trial court could impose it, she wrote.

“Prison sentences not required by statute should not be imposed by the words of this court,” she wrote.

2023-1318 and 2023-1417. State v. Logan, Slip Opinion No. 2025-Ohio-1772.

View oral argument video of this case.

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