Court Rejects Teacher’s Request to Order Backpay

The Supreme Court of Ohio today rejected a schoolteacher’s request for five years of backpay, finding she could have pursued the issue through her union contract.

In a unanimous per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed an Eighth District Court of Appeals decision denying Emily Johnston’s request for additional pay dating back to the 2018-2019 school year. She argued she has received less pay from the North Olmsted City School District than her educational experience merits.

Johnston maintained the standard collective bargaining agreement process was inadequate to pursue the issue because the contract does not allow for backpay issues to be considered. In a 2-1 decision, the Eighth District found she could have been filing grievances all this time with the North Olmsted school board to challenge her pay. The Supreme Court agreed.

“Johnston asks us to grant a writ of mandamus ordering that the school board change her placement on the salary schedule and give her backpay. But the grievance procedure set forth in the collective-bargaining agreement offered Johnston an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,” the per curiam opinion stated.

The Court explained a writ of mandamus is a remedy that courts can usually offer only when a person can establish there is no other way of obtaining a legal remedy.

Initial Teaching Contract Lower Than Offer
Before Johnston was hired, the school board offered her a salary reflecting 10 years of teaching experience and a master’s degree. Before she signed the contract, the board recalculated its offer, basing it on only six years of experience. The reason for the change was not mentioned.

After signing the contract, Johnston became a member of the district’s teacher’s union and was covered by the collective bargaining agreement with the school board. However, she did not file a grievance regarding the pay dispute. In May 2023, nearly five years after working for the district, she sought a writ of mandamus from the Eighth District. She argued she would have earned a higher initial salary and higher pay over the past five years had the contract been based on 10 years of teaching experience.

Johnston alleged she signed the letter taking the lower salary because the school year was about to start, and she did not want to risk being unemployed by insisting on a higher salary.

The Eighth District ruled a writ could not be granted because she could have followed the union contract’s grievance procedures. Johnston appealed the Eighth District’s decision to the Supreme Court, arguing because the grievance procedure cannot be used to seek backpay, it is not an adequate remedy.

Supreme Court Analyzed Salary Dispute Procedures
State statute sets a minimum salary schedule for all teachers employed by a board of education. However, R.C. 3317.14 permits school districts to adopt their own salary schedules, which North Olmsted did. The school board adopted the salary schedule as part of its collecting bargaining agreement with the teacher’s union.

In addition to establishing the district’s method for calculating experience, the collective bargaining agreement also established a grievance procedure. A grievance starts with filing a written complaint with the principal or employee’s supervisor and ends with binding arbitration.

Johnston argued that when she signed the contract offering less pay, she was not yet a union member and could not benefit from the agreement’s grievance procedure. The Court found that after she received her first paycheck, she could have filed a grievance. The opinion noted that Johnston herself contended that “salary underpayment is a continuing contract violation,” and after every paycheck for the last five years, she could file a grievance.

Johnston told the Court she “sought to have the issue corrected” but did not explain how and did not file a grievance. The Court noted she became subject to the collective bargaining agreement once she started working for the school district and was bound to follow the grievance procedures in the agreement.

“Johnston waited nearly five years before seeking extraordinary relief even though an opportunity to challenge salary-schedule placement through the grievance procedure cropped up with every paycheck,” the Court stated. “She could have filed such a grievance immediately based on her original placement on the schedule or under her theory within 25 days of any paycheck since then.”

Johnston also argued she could seek a court order rather than file a grievance because the collective bargaining agreement does not specify how to pursue a “right to proper pay.” She noted that R.C. 4117.10(A) states that when a collective bargaining agreement makes no specification about a matter, the employer and employee are subject to all applicable state and local laws pertaining to wages, hours, and conditions of employment. The state laws setting teacher salary schedules govern the right to proper pay. Because nothing in the contract overrides those laws, she did not have to file a grievance and could pursue the matter in court, she maintained.

The Court found the school board used its right to adopt its own higher salary schedule under R.C. 3117.14.  The higher salary schedule Johnston brought to the Court was part of the collective bargaining agreement, which included a grievance procedure. 

The Court stated that Johnston’s failure to use the grievance procedure to correct her perceived underpayment when she was first hired “does not undermine the fact that she had” an opportunity from the beginning of her employment until the present to address the matter through the grievance process. Since the grievance procedure is a legal remedy that Johnston can pursue, she is not entitled to a writ from the Court, the opinion concluded.

2024-0462. State ex rel. Johnston v. N. Olmsted School Dist. Bd. of Edn., Slip Opinion No. 2025-Ohio-1233.

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